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Abstract
A continuous-time Markov process is proposed to analyze how a group of humans solves a complex task, consisting in the
search of the optimal set of decisions on a fitness landscape. Individuals change their opinions driven by two different forces: (i)
the self-interest, which pushes them to increase their own fitness values, and (ii) the social interactions, which push individuals
to reduce the diversity of their opinions in order to reach consensus. Results show that the performance of the group is strongly
affected by the strength of social interactions and by the level of knowledge of the individuals. Increasing the strength of
social interactions improves the performance of the team. However, too strong social interactions slow down the search of
the optimal solution and worsen the performance of the group. In particular, we find that the threshold value of the social
interaction strength, which leads to the emergence of a superior intelligence of the group, is just the critical threshold at which
the consensus among the members sets in. We also prove that a moderate level of knowledge is already enough to guarantee
high performance of the group in making decisions.
Keywords: Decision making, social interactions, complexity, Markov chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of groups to solve complex problems that
exceed individual skills is widely recognized in natural,
human, and artificial contexts. Animals in groups, e.g.
flocks of birds, ant colonies, and schools of fish, exhibit
collective intelligence when performing different tasks as
which direction to travel in, foraging, and defence from
predators [1, 2]. Artificial systems such as groups of
robots behaving in a self organized manner show supe-
rior performance in solving their tasks, when they adopt
algorithms inspired by the animal behaviors in groups [3–
6]. Human groups such as organizational teams outper-
form the single individuals in a variety of tasks, including
problem solving, innovative projects, and production is-
sues [7–11].
The superior ability of groups in solving tasks origi-
nates from collective decision making: agents (animals,
robots, humans) make choices, pursuing their individual
goals (forage, survive, etc.) on the basis of their own
knowledge and amount of information (position, sight,
etc.), and adapting their behavior to the actions of the
other agents. The group-living enables social interactions
to take place as a mechanism for knowledge and infor-
mation sharing [9, 12–21]. Even though the single agents
posses a limited knowledge, and the actions they perform
usually are very simple, the collective behavior, enabled
by the social interactions, leads to the emergence of a su-
perior intelligence of the group. This property is known
as swarm intelligence [22–24] and wisdom of crowds [25].
In this paper we focus on human groups solving com-
plex combinatorial problems. Many managerial problems
including new product development, organizational de-
sign, and business strategy planning may be conceived
as problems where the effective combinations of multiple
and interdependent decision variables should be identi-
fied [26–29]. We develop a model of collective decision
making, which attempts to capture the main drivers of
the individual behaviors in groups, i.e., self-interest and
consensus seeking. We consider that individuals make
choices based on rational calculation and self-interested
motivations. Agent’s choices are made by optimizing
the perceived fitness value, which is an estimation of the
real fitness value based on the level of agent’s knowledge
[1, 30, 31]. However, any decision made by an individ-
ual is influenced by the relationships he/she has with
the other group members. This social influence pushes
the individual to modify the choice he/she made, for the
natural tendency of humans to seek consensus and avoid
conflict with people they interact with [32].
We use the Ising-Glauber dynamics [33, 34] to model
the social interactions among group members. TheN−K
model [35, 36] is employed to build the fitness landscape
associated with the problem to solve. A continuous-
time Markov chain governs the decision-making process,
whose complexity is controlled by the parameter K. We
define the transition rate of individual’s opinion change
as the product of the Ising-Glauber rate ([34]), which
implements the consensus seeking [38–41], and an expo-
nential rate [42, 43] ,which speeds up or slows down the
change of opinion, to model the rational behavior of the
individual.
Herein, we explore how both the strength of social in-
teractions and the level of knowledge of the members
influence the group performance. We identify in which
circumstances human groups are particularly effective in
solving complex problems. We extend previous stud-
ies highlighting the efficacy of collecting decision making
in presence of a noisy environment [44], and in condi-
tions of cognitive limitations[2, 9, 45–47]. This decision-
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making model might be proposed as optimization tech-
nique belonging to the class of swarm intelligence tech-
niques [22, 48–52].
II. THE MODEL
We consider a human group made of M socially in-
teracting members, which is assigned to solve a complex
task. The task consists in solving a combinatorial deci-
sion making problem by identifying the set of decisions
(choice configuration) with the highest fitness. The fit-
ness function is built employing the N−K model [35–37].
A N -dimensional vector space of decisions is considered,
where each choice configuration is represented by a vec-
tor d = (d1, d2, ..., dN ). Each decision is a binary variable
that may take only two values +1 or −1, i.e. di = ±1,
i = 1, 2, ..., N . The total number of decision vectors is
therefore 2N . Each vector d is associated with a certain
fitness value V (d) computed as the weighted sum of N
stochastic contributionsWj
(
dj , d
j
1, d
j
2, .., d
j
K
)
, each deci-
sion leads to total fitness depending on the value of the
decision dj itself and the values of other K decisions d
j
i ,
i = 1, 2, ...,K. Following the classical N−K [35–37] pro-
cedure (more details are provided in Appendix A), the
quantities Wj ∈ [0, 1] are determined as randomly gen-
erated 2K+1-element “interaction tables”. The fitness
function of the group is defined as
V (d) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
Wj
(
dj , d
j
1, d
j
2, .., d
j
K
)
(1)
The integer index K = 0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1 is the number of
interacting decision variables, and tunes the complexity
of the problem. The complexity of the problem increases
with K. Note that, for K > 2, in computational com-
plexity theory, finding the optimum of the fitness func-
tion V (d) is classified as a NP-complete decision problem
[37]. This makes this approach particularly suited in our
case.
We model the level of knowledge of the k-th member
of the group (with k = 1, 2, ...M) by defining the M ×N
competence matrixD, whose elementsDkj take the value
Dkj = 1 if the member k knows the contribution of the
decision j to the total fitness V , otherwise Dkj = 0.
Based on the level of knowledge each member k computes
his/her own perceived fitness (self-interest) as
Vk (d) =
∑N
j=1DkjWj
(
dj , d
j
1, d
j
2, .., d
j
K
)
∑N
j=1Dkj
. (2)
Each member of the group makes his/her choices driven
by the rational behavior, which pushes him/her to in-
crease the self-interest, and by social interactions, which
push the member to seek consensus within the group.
When Dkj = 0, for j = 1, 2, ...N the k-th member pos-
sesses no knowledge about the fitness function, and his
FIG. 1: A two-layer multiplex network. Each layer is as-
sociated with one single decision variable. Blue lines repre-
sent social links between members, whereas dashed red lines
represent the interconnections between the decisions of each
member.
choices are driven only by consensus seeking. Note that
the choice configuration that optimizes the perceived fit-
ness Eq. (2), does not necessarily optimize the group fit-
ness Eq. (1). This makes the mechanism of social interac-
tions, by means of which knowledge is transferred, crucial
for achieving high-performing decision-making process.
We build the matrix D, by randomly choosing Dkj = 1
with probability p ∈ [0, 1], and Dkj = 0 with probability
1 − p. By increasing p from 0 to 1 we control the level
of knowledge of the members, which affects the ability of
the group in maximizing the fitness function Eq. (1).
All members of the group make choices on each of
the N decision variables dj . Therefore, the state of the
k-th member (k = 1, 2, ..,M) is identified by the N -
dimensional vector σk =
(
σ1k, σ
2
k, ...σ
N
k
)
, where σjk = ±1
is a binary variable representing the opinion of the k-th
member on the j-th decision. For any given decision vari-
able dj , individuals k and h agree if σ
j
k = σ
j
h, otherwise
they disagree. Within the framework of Ising’s approach
[38, 40, 41], disagreement is characterized by a certain
level of conflict Ejkh (energy level) between the two so-
cially interacting members k and h, i.e. Ejkh = −Jσ
j
kσ
j
h,
where J is the strength of the social interaction. There-
fore, the total level of conflict on the decision dj is given
by:
Ej = −
∑
(k,h)
Jσjkσ
j
h (3)
where the symbol () indicates that the sum is limited to
the nearest neighbors, i.e. to those individuals which are
directly connected by a social link.
A multiplex network [53–57] with N different layers
is defined. On each layer, individuals share their opin-
ions on a certain decision variable dj leading to a cer-
tain level of conflict Ej . The graph of social network
on the layer dj is described in terms of the symmetric
adjacency matrix Aj with elements Ajkh. The intercon-
nections between different layers represent the interac-
tions among the opinions of the same individual k on the
decision variables. Figure 1 shows an example of a mul-
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tiplex network with only two layers, where the dashed
lines connecting the different decision layers represent
the interaction between the opinions that each member
has on the decision variables. This interaction occurs
via the N −K perceived fitness, i.e. changing the opin-
ion on the decision variable j causes a modification of
the perceived pay-off, which also depends on the opin-
ions the member has on the remaining decision variables.
In order to model the dynamics of decision-making in
terms of a continuous-time Markov process, we define the
state vector s of the entire group as s =(s1, s2, ..., sn) =(
σ11 , σ
2
1 , ...σ
N
1 , σ
1
2 , σ
2
2 , ...σ
N
2 , ..., σ
1
M , σ
2
M , ...σ
N
M
)
of size n =
M × N , and the block diagonal adjacency matrix A =
diag
(
A
1,A2, ...,AN
)
. For any given l-th component
sl = σ
j
k of the vector s it is possible to uniquely iden-
tify the member k and the decision variable j by means
of the relations k = quotient (l − 1,M) + 1, and j =
mod (l − 1,M) + 1. The total level of conflict can be
then rephrased as
E (s) = −
1
2
JAs · s =−
1
2
J
∑
ij
Aijsisj (4)
Observe that Aii = 0 (with i = 1, ..., n). In Eq. (4) the
term 1/2 avoids that each couple of members k and h
be double counted. Now let be P (s, t) the probability
that, at time t, the state vector takes the value s out of
2n possible states. The time evolution of the probability
P (s, t) obeys the master equation
dP (s, t)
dt
= −
∑
l
w (sl → s
′
l)P (sl, t) (5)
+
∑
l
w (s′l → sl)P (s
′
l, t)
where sl = (s1, s2, ..., sl, ..., sn), s
′
l =
(s1, s2, ...,−sl, ..., sn). The transition rate w (sl → s
′
l)
is the probability per unit time that the opinion sl
flips to −sl while the others remain temporarily fixed.
Recalling that flipping of opinions is governed by social
interactions and self-interest a possible ansatz for the
transition rates is
w (sl → s
′
l) =
1
2
[
1− sl tanh
(
βJ
∑
h
Alhsh
)]
(6)
× exp {β′ [∆V (s′l, sl)]}
In Eq. (6) the pay-off function ∆V (s′l, sl) = V¯ (s
′
l) −
V¯ (sl), where V¯ (sl) = Vk (σk), is simply the change of the
fitness perceived by the agent k = quotient (l − 1,M) +
1, when its opinion sl = σ
j
k on the decision j =
mod (l − 1,M) + 1 changes from sl = σ
j
k to s
′
l = −σ
j
k.
The transition rates w (sl → s
′
l) have been chosen to be
the product of the transition rate of the Ising-Glauber
dynamics [34] (see also Appendix B), and the Weidlich
exponential rate exp {β′ [∆V (s′k, sk)]}[42, 43]. Note that
Eq. (6) satisfies the detailed balance condition (see Ap-
pendix C). In Eq. (6) the quantity β is the inverse of
the so-called social temperature and is a measure of the
chaotic circumstances, which lead to a random opinion
change. The term β′ is related to the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with the information about the per-
ceived fitness (the higher β′ the less the uncertainty).
To solve the Markov process Eqs. (5, 6), we employ a
simplified version of the exact stochastic simulation algo-
rithm proposed by Gillespie [58, 59]. A brief summary of
the algorithm is provided in Appendix D. The algorithm
allows to generate a statistically correct trajectory of the
stochastic process Eqs. (5, 6).
III. MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING PRO-
CESS
The group fitness value Eq. (1) and the level of
agreement between the members (i.e. social consensus)
are used to measure the performance of the collective-
decision making process. To calculate the group fit-
ness value, the vector d =(d1, d2, ..., dN ) needs to be
determined. To this end, consider the set of opinions(
σj1, σ
j
2, ..., σ
j
M
)
that the members of the group have
about the decision j, at time t. The decision dj is ob-
tained by employing the majority rule, i.e. we set
dj = sgn
(
M−1
∑
k
σjk
)
, j = 1, 2, ..., N (7)
If M is even and in the case of a parity condition, dj
is, instead, uniformly chosen at random between the two
possible values ±1. The group fitness is then calculated
as V [d (t)] and the ensemble average 〈V (t)〉 is then eval-
uated. The efficacy of the group in optimizing 〈V (t)〉
is then calculated in terms of normalized average fitness
〈V (t)〉 /Vmax where Vmax = max [V (d)].
The consensus of the members on the decision variable
j is measured as follows. We define the average opinion
σ¯j of the group on the decision j
σ¯j =
1
M
∑
k
σjk (8)
Note that the quantity σ¯j ranges in the interval −1 ≤
σ¯j ≤ 1, and that σ¯j = ±1 only when full consensus is
reached. Therefore, a possible measure of the consensus
among the members on the decision variable j is given
by the ensemble average of the time-dependent quantity
Cj =
(
σ¯j
)2
∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
〈
Cj (t)
〉
=
1
M2
∑
kh
〈
σjk (t)σ
j
h (t)
〉
=
1
M2
∑
kh
Rjhk (t)
(9)
Note that
〈
σjk (t)σ
j
h (t)
〉
= Rjhk (t) is the correlation
function of the opinions of the members k and h on the
same decision variable j. Given this, a possible ansatz to
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measure the entire consensus of the group on the whole
set of decisions is
〈C (t)〉 =
1
N
∑
j
〈
Cj (t)
〉
=
1
M2N
N∑
j=1
M∑
kh=1
Rjhk (t) (10)
Note that 0 ≤ 〈C (t)〉 ≤ 1.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We consider, unless differently specified, a group of
M = 6 members which have to make N = 12 decisions.
For the sake of simplicity, the network of social interac-
tions on each decision layer j is described by a complete
graph, where each member is connected to all the others.
We also set β′ = 10, since we assume that the information
about the perceived fitness function is characterized by a
low level of uncertainty. We simulate many diverse sce-
narios to investigate the influence of the parameter p, i.e.
of the level of knowledge of the members, and the effect of
the parameter βJ on the final outcome of the decision-
making process. The simulation is stopped at steady-
state. This condition is identified by simply taking the
time-average of consensus and pay-off over consecutive
time intervals of fixed length T and by checking that the
difference between two consecutive averages is sufficiently
small. For any given p and βJ , each stochastic process
Eqs. (5, 6) is simulated by generating 100 different re-
alizations (trajectories). For each single realization, the
competence matrix D is set, and the initial state of the
system is obtained by drawing from a uniform probabil-
ity distribution, afterwards the time evolution of the state
vector is calculated with the stochastic simulation algo-
rithm (see Appendix D). Fig. 2 shows the time-evolution
of normalized average fitness 〈V (t)〉 /Vmax, for p = 0.5
(i.e. for a moderate level of knowledge of the members),
different values of the complexity parameterK = 1, 5, 11,
and different values of βJ = 0.0, 0.5, 1.0. We observe that
for βJ = 0, i.e. in absence of social interactions [see Fig.
2(a)] the decision-making process is strongly inefficient,
as witnessed by the very low value of the average fit-
ness of the group. Each individual of the group makes
his/her choices in order to optimize the perceived fitness,
but, because of the absence of social interactions, he/she
behaves independently from the others and does not re-
ceive any feedback about the actions of the other group
members. Hence, individuals remain close to their local
optima, group fitness cannot be optimized [see Fig. 2(a)],
and the consensus is low [see Fig. 3(a)].As the strength
of social interactions increases, i.e., βJ = 0.5 [Fig. 2(b)],
members can exchange information about their choices.
Social interactions push the individuals to seek consensus
with the member who is experiencing higher payoff. In
fact, on the average, those members, which find a higher
increase of their perceived fitness, change opinion much
faster than the others. Thus, the other members, in pro-
cess of seeking consensus, skip the local optima of their
FIG. 2: The time-evolution of the normalized average group
fitness 〈V (t)〉 /Vmax, for p = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11. βJ = 0.0, (a);
βJ = 0.5, (b); βJ = 1.0, (c).
perceived fitness and keep exploring the landscape, lead-
ing to a substantial increase of the group performance
both in terms of group fitness values [Fig. 2(b)] as well as
in terms of final consensus [Fig. 3(b)]. Thus, the system
collectively shows a higher level of knowledge and higher
ability in making good choices than the single members
(i.e., a higher degree of intelligence). It is noteworthy
that when the strength of social interactions is too large,
βJ = 1, [Fig. 2(c)] the performance of the group in
terms of fitness value worsens. In fact, very high values of
βJ , accelerating the achievement of consensus among the
4
FIG. 3: The time-evolution of the statistically averaged con-
sensus 〈C (t)〉 for p = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11. βJ = 0.0, (a);
βJ = 0.5, (b); βJ = 1.0, (c).
members [Fig. 3(c)], significantly impede the exploration
of the fitness landscape and hamper that change of opin-
ions can be guided by payoff improvements. The search
of the optimum on the fitness landscape is slowed down,
and the performance of the collective decision-making de-
creases both in terms of the time required to reach the
steady-state as well as in terms of group fitness.
Figure 2 shows that rising the complexity of the land-
scape, i.e. increasing K, negatively affects the per-
formance of the collective decision-making process, but
does not qualitatively change the behavior of the system.
FIG. 4: The stationary values of the normalized averaged
fitness 〈V∞〉 /Vmax as a function of βJ , (a); and of the sta-
tistically averaged consensus 〈C∞〉 as a function of βJ , (b).
Results are presented for p = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11
However, Figure 2(b) also shows that, in order to cause
a significant worsening of the group fitness, K must take
very large values, i.e., K = 11. Instead, at moderate,
but still significant, values of complexity (see results for
K = 5) the decision-making process is still very effective,
leading to final group fitness values comparable to those
obtained at the lowest level of complexity, i.e., at K = 1.
In Figure 3 the ensemble average 〈C (t)〉 of the consen-
sus among the members is shown as a function of time
t, for p = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11, and for different values of
βJ = 0.0, 0.5, 1.0. At βJ = 0, the consensus is low.
In this case, at each time t, members’ opinions are ran-
dom variables almost uniformly distributed between the
two states ±1. Hence, the quantity 〈C (t)〉 can be ana-
lytically calculated as 〈C (t)〉 ≈ 1/M . For M = 6 this
gives 〈C (t)〉 ≈ 0.16, which is just the average value ob-
served in Fig. 3(a). As the strength of social interactions
rises, members more easily converge toward a common
opinion. However, the random nature of the opinion dy-
namics still prevents full agreement from being achieved,
see Fig. 3(b). This, as observed in Figure 2(b), has
a very beneficial effect as individuals continue exploring
the fitness landscape looking for maxima, thus leading to
higher performance of the collective decision-making pro-
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FIG. 5: The stationary values of the normalized averaged
fitness 〈V∞〉 /Vmax as a function of MβJ , (a); and of the sta-
tistically averaged consensus 〈C∞〉 as a function ofMβJ , (b).
Results are presented for p = 0.5, K = 5 and for three differ-
ent team sizes: M = 6, 12, 24.
cess. However, when the strength of social interactions
is significantly increased, a very high value of consen-
sus among members is rapidly achieved [see Fig. 3(c)],
the exploration of the landscape is slowed down, and
the performance of the decision making-process signifi-
cantly worsen, see Figure 2(c). We, then, expect that,
given β′and K, a optimum of βJ exists, which maxi-
mizes the steady-state fitness of the group. This is, in-
deed, confirmed by the analysis shown in Figure 4, where
the steady-state values of the normalized group fitness
〈V∞〉 /Vmax = 〈V (t→∞)〉 /Vmax [Fig. 4(a)], and social
consensus 〈C∞〉 = 〈C (t→∞)〉 [Fig. 4(b)] are plotted
as a function of βJ , for p = 0.5 and the three considered
values of K = 1, 5, 11. results in Figure 4(a) stresses
that the fitness landscape complexity (i.e., the parame-
terK) marginally affects the performance of the decision-
making process in terms of group fitness, provided that
K does not take too high values. In fact curves calcu-
lated for K = 1, 5 run close to each-other. More interest-
ing, Figure 4 shows that increasing βJ from zero, makes
both 〈V∞〉 /Vmax and 〈C∞〉 rapidly increase. This in-
crement is, then, followed by a region of a slow change
of 〈V∞〉 /Vmax and 〈C∞〉. It is worth noticing, that the
FIG. 6: The time-evolution of the normalized average group
fitness 〈V (t)〉 /Vmax for βJ = 0.5, p = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 1.
K = 1, (a); K = 5, (b); K = 11, (c).
highest group fitness value is obtained at the boundary
between the increasing and almost stationary regions of
〈C∞〉. Moreover, results show that high consensus is nec-
essary to guarantee high efficacy of the decision-making
process, i.e. high values of 〈V∞〉 /Vmax. This suggests
that the decision making becomes optimal, i.e. the group
as a whole is characterized by a higher degree of intelli-
gence, at the point where the system dynamics changes
qualitatively. This aspect of the problem is investigated
in Figure 5 where the stationary values of normalized
group-fitness and consensus are shown as a function of
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FIG. 7: The time-evolution of the statistically averaged con-
sensus 〈C (t)〉 for βJ = 0.5, p = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 1. K = 1,
(a); K = 5, (b); K = 11, (c).
the quantity βJM for different sizes M = 6, 12, 24, for
N = 12 and K = 5. Notably, the transition from low to
high fitness values is always accompanied by an analo-
gous transition from low to high consensus of the group.
The transition becomes sharper and sharper as the group
size M is incremented. In all cases the transition occurs
for βJM ≈ 1. This value is particularly interesting as
it can be easily shown, by using a mean-field approach
(see Appendix E), that for large Ising systems M ≫ 1
and in the case of complete graphs, the critical values
(βJ)c, at which consensus sets in, satisfies the relation
FIG. 8: The stationary values of the normalized average group
fitness 〈V∞〉 /Vmax as a function of p, (a); and of the statisti-
cally averaged consensus 〈C∞〉 as a function of p, (b). Results
are presented for βJ = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11
(βJ)c = 1/M , in perfect agreement with our small-size
numerical calculations. This is a very important result,
which has analogies in many different self-organizing sys-
tems, as flocking systems and information flow processing
[60–64].
In Figure 6 we investigate the influence of the level
of knowledge p of members on the time-evolution of the
normalized average fitness 〈V (t)〉 /Vmax. Results are pre-
sented for βJ = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11, and for different values
of p = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 1.0. Results show that improv-
ing the knowledge of the members, i.e. increasing p, en-
hances the performance of the decision-making process.
In particular, a higher steady-state normalized fitness
〈V∞〉 /Vmax, and a faster convergence toward the steady-
state are observed. Note also, that, especially in the case
of high complexity [Figure 6(b,c)], increasing p above 0.2
reduces the fluctuations of 〈V (t)〉, as a consequence of
the higher agreement achieved among the members at
higher level of knowledge. This is clear in Figure 7, where
the time-evolution of the consensus 〈C (t)〉 is shown for
βJ = 0.5, K = 1, 5, 11, and p = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.6, 1.0. In
Figure 8 the steady-state values of the normalized group
fitness 〈V∞〉 /Vmax [Fig. 8(a)], and social consensus 〈C∞〉
[Fig. 8(b)] are shown as a function of p, for βJ = 0.5
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and the three considered values of K = 1, 5, 11. Note
that as p is increased from zero, the steady state value
〈V∞〉 /Vmax initially grows fast [Fig. 8(a)]. In fact, be-
cause of social interactions, increasing the knowledge of
each member also increases the knowledge of the group as
a whole. But, above a certain threshold of p the increase
of 〈V∞〉 /Vmax is much less significant. This indicates
that the knowledge of the group is subjected to a satu-
ration effect. Therefore, a moderate level of knowledge
is already enough to guarantee very good performance of
decision-making process, higher knowledge levels being
only needed to accelerate the convergence of the decision-
making process. Figure 8(b) shows that for vanishing
values of p the consensus 〈C∞〉 takes high values, as each
member’s choice is driven only by consensus seeking. In-
creasing p initially causes a decrease of consensus, as the
self-interest of each member leads to a certain level of
disagreement. However, a further increment of p makes
the members’ knowledge overlap so that the self-interest
of each member almost points in the same direction, re-
sulting in a consensus increase.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we developed a model of collective
decision-making in human groups in presence of com-
plex environment. The model described the time evo-
lution of group choices in terms of a time-continuous
Markov process, where the transition rates have been de-
fined so as to capture the effect of the two main forces,
which drive the change of opinion of the members of
the group. These forces are the rational behavior which
pushes each member to increase his/her self-interest, and
the social interactions, which push the members to reach
a common opinion. Our study provides contribution to
the literature identifying under which circumstances col-
lective decision making is more performing. We found
that a moderate strength of social interactions allows
for knowledge transfer among the members, leading to
higher knowledge level of the group as a whole. This
mechanism, coupled with the ability to explore the fit-
ness landscape, strongly improves the performance of
the decision-making process. In particular we found that
the threshold value of the social interaction strength, at
which the entire group behaves as unique entity charac-
terized by a higher degree of intelligence, is just the crit-
ical threshold at which the consensus among the mem-
bers sets in. This value can be also calculated for large
systems trough mean-field techniques and results to be
in perfect agreement with our small system calculations.
One can therefore estimate for any given social temper-
ature β−1 and social interaction strength J the optimal
number Mopt ≈ (βJ)
−1 of team members leading to the
emergence of a superior intelligence of the group.
We also found that increasing the level of knowledge of
the members improves performance. However, above a
certain threshold the knowledge of the group saturates,
i.e. the performance of the collective decision-making
process becomes much less sensitive to the level of knowl-
edge of each single member. Therefore, we can state that
the collective decision-making is very high-performing al-
ready at moderate level of knowledge of the members,
and that very high knowledge of all members only serves
to accelerate the convergence of the decision-making pro-
cess. Our results also showed that human groups with
optimal levels of members’ knowledge and strength of
social interactions very well manage complex problems.
Appendix A: The N −K fitness landscape genera-
tion
In the N −K model a real valued fitness is assigned to
each bit string d =(d1, d2, ..., dN ), where di = ±1. This
is done by first assigning a real valued contributionWi to
the i-th bit di, and then by defining the fitness function
as V (d) = N−1
∑N
j=1Wj
(
dj , d
j
1, d
j
2, .., d
j
K
)
. Each con-
tribution Wi depends not just on i and di but also on K
(0 ≤ K < N) other bits. Now let us define the substring
si =
(
di, d
i
1, d
i
2, .., d
i
K
)
, by chosing at random, for each
bit i, K other bits. Each single contribution Wi (si) is
then a random function of 2K+1 possible values of si, and
its value is drawn from a uniform distribution. Thus, a
random table of contributions is generated independently
for each i-th bit, thus allowing the calculate of the fitness
function V (d). The reader is referred to Refs. [35–37]
for more details on the N −K complex landscapes.
Appendix B: The Glauber dynamics on general
graphs
Consider the Ising model on a general graph with ad-
jacency matrix Aij . The total energy of the system is
given in Eq. (4). In steady state conditions the station-
ary distribution of the probability of the states P0 (s) is
given by the Boltzmann distribution
P0 (s) =
exp [−βE (s)]
Z
(B1)
where Z =
∑
l exp [−βE (sl)] is the partition function of
the system. The detailed balance condition then requires
that
w (sl → s
′
l)
w (s′l → sl)
=
P0 (s
′
l)
P0 (sl)
=
exp [−βE (s′l)]
exp [−βE (sl)]
(B2)
Now observe that
E (sl) = −Jsl
∑
j
Aljsj −
1
2
J
∑
ij 6=l
Aijsisj (B3)
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Substituting Eqs. (B3) in Eq. (B2) and recalling that
exp (x) = cosh (x) + sinh (x) we get
w (sl → s
′
l)
w (s′l → sl)
=
1− tanh
(
βJsl
∑
j Aljsj
)
1 + tanh
(
βJsl
∑
j Aljsj
) (B4)
Noting that sl = ±1, so that tanh
(
βJsl
∑
j Aljsj
)
=
sl tanh
(
βJ
∑
j Aljsj
)
we finally obtain
w (sl → s
′
l)
w (s′l → sl)
=
1− sl tanh
(
βJ
∑
j Aljsj
)
1 + sl tanh
(
βJ
∑
j Aljsj
) (B5)
Therefore, a possible choice for the transition rates for
the Ising-Glauber dynamics on general graph is
w (sl → s
′
l) = α

1− sl tanh

βJ∑
j
Aljsj



 (B6)
where α is an arbitrary constant. We have chosen α =
1/2.
Appendix C: Detailed balance condition
Here we show that the transition rate given in Eq. (6)
fulfils the detailed balance condition of Markov chains,
which requires the existence of a stationary probability
distribution P0 (sl) such that
P0 (s
′
l)
P0 (sl)
=
w (sl → s
′
l)
w (s′l → sl)
(C1)
Using Eq. (6) the above condition Eq. (C1) writes
P0 (s
′
l)
P0 (sl)
=
1− sl tanh (βJ
∑
hAlhsh)
1 + sl tanh (βJ
∑
hAlhsh)
(C2)
×
exp
{
β′
[
V¯ (s′l)− V¯ (sl)
]}
exp
{
β′
[
V¯ (sl)− V¯ (s′l)
]}
and recalling Eqs. (B2, B5) yields
P0 (s
′
l)
P0 (sl)
=
exp
[
−βE (s′l) + 2β
′V¯ (s′l)
]
exp
[
−βE (sl) + 2β′V¯ (sl)
] (C3)
this allows to define the stationary probability distribu-
tion
P0 (sl) =
exp
[
−βE (sl) + 2β
′V¯ (sl)
]
∑
k exp
[
−βE (sk) + 2β′V¯ (sk)
] (C4)
which satisfies the detailed balance condition Eq. (C1).
Appendix D: The stochastic simulation algorithm
The stochastic simulation algorithm we use to solve
the Markov process (5) is derived from the one proposed
by Gillespie [58, 59]. We just summarize the main steps
of the algorithm:
1. Choose a random initial state s of the system
2. Calculate the transition rates w (sl → s
′
l)
3. Calculate the total rate wT =
∑
l w (sl → s
′
l)
4. Normalize the transition rates as νl =
w (sl → s
′
l) /wT
5. Construct the cumulative distribution F (νl) from
the probability mass function νl
6. Calculate the time ∆t to the next opinion flip draw-
ing from an exponential distribution with mean
1/wT , i.e. choose a real random number 0 ≤
r < 1 from a uniform distribution and set ∆t =
−w−1T log (r).
7. Identify the k-th opinion sk which flips from sk to
−sk by drawing from a discrete distribution with
probability mass function νl, i.e. draw a real ran-
dom number 0 ≤ s < 1 from a uniform distribution
and choose k so that F (νk−1) ≤ s < F (νk).
8. Update the state vector and return to step 2 or
quit.
Appendix E: The mean-field calculations of the
Ising model on a complete graph.
On a complete graph the total energy of a system of
M spins is
E = −
∑
k<h
Jσkσh (E1)
and the average magnetization is 〈σ〉 = M−1
∑
k 〈σk〉.
Using Eq. (B6) the Ising-Glauber rate becomes
wk = w (σk → −σk) =
1
2

1− σk tanh

βJ∑
j 6=k
σj




(E2)
Using Eq. (5) one can easily derive the following equation
of motion for the average magnetization 〈σk〉 of the k-th
site
d 〈σk〉
dt
= −2 〈wkσk〉 = −〈σk〉+
〈
tanh

βJ∑
j
σj

〉
(E3)
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Assuming that M is large, using 〈σ〉 = M−1
∑
k 〈σk〉,
and exploiting the mean field approach we
write
〈
tanh
[
βJ
∑
j σj
]〉
= tanh
[
βJ
∑
j 〈σj〉
]
=
tanh [〈σ〉 βJM ], and
d 〈σ〉
dt
= −〈σ〉+ tanh [〈σ〉 βJM ] (E4)
The average magnetization 〈σ〉 at the fixed point of Eq.
(E4) satisfies the relation
〈σ〉 = tanh [〈σ〉MβJ ] (E5)
For MβJ ≤ 1 only the trivial solution 〈σ〉1 = 0 can
be found. However, for MβJ > 1 other two solutions
〈σ〉2 = −〈σ〉3 > 0 appear which depends on the specific
value of MβJ . In this case 〈σ〉1 = 0 becomes unstable.
Thus, the critical point for the phase transition is
(βJ)c =
1
M
(E6)
The above equation is in perfect agreement with the re-
sults shown in Fig. 5, thus confirming that the decision
making process of the group becomes optimal just when
the system changes qualitatively its dynamics.
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